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In the course of war, who determines what is just and fair? Fairness 
and justice are and should be universal constants; however, the paths to 
fairness and justice must be malleable and adapt to different circumstances. 
The Nuremberg trials were marked by a conscious effort to avoid 
“victor’s justice” and provide a fair trial to the defendants who committed 
acts of atrocity. This paper examines whether this goal was achieved in the 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, and International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia trials, as well as briefly touching upon the Guantanamo military 
commission trials, by looking particularly at the use of hearsay evidence. By 
placing greater weight on evidentiary criteria such as “relevance,” 
“probative value,” “reliability,” and “credibility” and developing a more 
uniform application of these terms rather than promoting a black and white 
dichotomy of the admissibility of hearsay evidence, judges can better 
perform the delicate balancing act of justice that takes place amidst the 
chaos and hostility of war. 
War is not a normal circumstance and war crimes are not normal 
crimes as contemplated by national laws. The path to justice requires 
flexibility and attention to the precarious circumstances surrounding a world 
emerging from complete upheaval. The general admissibility of hearsay 
evidence, in itself, does not provide a great threat to the rights of the accused 
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in the course of war crimes trials. Examination of these war crimes trials 
indicate that, contrary to common law perceptions, it is possible to allow 
typically inadmissible evidence and still preserve fairness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Is justice, like beauty, only in the eyes of the beholder? The concept of 
justice is neither completely objective nor concrete. Interpretations vary 
throughout history, between countries and persons, and with changing 
circumstances. In war, everything changes. Perceptions of right and wrong 
become malleable and, arguably, subjective concepts. An action that is 
considered illegal or immoral in everyday life suddenly becomes just, or at 
least justifiable, when taken in connection with the surreal circumstances of 
war. To meet this fluid approach to “justice,” the law of armed conflict 
purports to provide guidance as to the legality of certain acts, given these 
new circumstances. 
Thus the concept of “victor’s justice” becomes a serious concern in 
connection with war crime trials where it is easy to conclude that the victor’s 
actions are justified while those of the defeated are unlawful. How could 
there possibly be a fair trial at Nuremberg for the Nazi soldiers who had a 
hand in massacring millions of people, in the Tokyo trials for the Japanese 
commanders who raped, murdered, and oversaw abuses in internment 
camps, or in the Trial Chambers for the former Yugoslavia for the Bosnian-
Serbs who committed genocide? Yet a guiding principle in setting up these 
tribunals was fairness and justice to all, even to the accused. 
As circumstances change and the concept of justice changes, the justice 
system itself in the context of war crimes might resemble, but cannot actually 
be the same, as that applicable to normal, everyday life. Consequently, there 
will necessarily be differences in approach to fundamental ideas of both 
substance and procedural justice. An example of how this similar-yet-
dissimilar system operates at the procedural level can be found in the hearsay 
rules of evidence. Hearsay is defined similarly across common law 
jurisdictions, broadly, as out-of-court statements (whether written or oral) 
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where the person asserting the evidence in court for the purpose of proving 
truth does not have first-hand knowledge of the facts asserted; it is 
information about the experiences of another.1 For example, A testifies that 
B told him he saw C stab D. However it is presented, hearsay evidence is 
such that the person ultimately making the assertion at issue, B in the 
previous example, is not available for any form of cross-examination. 
Civil and common law jurisdictions differ widely as to the extent of 
admissibility of such evidence. In civil law countries, hearsay is prima facie 
admissible, whereas in common law systems, it is only admissible under 
limited exceptions. This difference stems from the fact that trials in common 
law jurisdictions often involve layman jurors whom courts try to protect from 
unreliable or prejudicial information in making their factual determinations. 
In civil law trials, where the use of juries is not as common, judges are 
deemed capable of discerning the reliability of such evidence for themselves, 
therefore, there is less need for caution surrounding the admissibility and 
evaluation of hearsay evidence. 
In civil law systems, commonly referred to as the “inquisitorial model,” 
judges must evaluate all available evidence to arrive at their conclusion. By 
contrast, in the common law “adversarial model,” the two sides in a dispute 
argue before the judge and/or jury in the hopes that the truth will be revealed 
through the exercise of arguing. In the former model, the judge holds both 
the legal and fact-finding roles, leaving cumbersome evidentiary rules as 
only hindering his or her ability to properly adjudicate. As such, “hearsay is 
admitted and heard, but given weight only to the extent it is found to be 
reliable.”2 In the systems that prohibit hearsay evidence, the core reasoning 
lies with the jury’s role as the fact-finder who does not have the experience 
to properly evaluate and weigh different pieces of evidence.3 Where the 
judges act alone, having to both adduce the admissibility of the evidence as 
well as its ability to support either argument, the purpose of excluding 
hearsay evidence is no longer so clear.4 Ultimately, it appears that the 
admissibility of hearsay hinges on the concept of evidentiary reliability. 
Even if one were to accept the common law standard of excluding hearsay 
evidence for use at war-crimes trials, many exceptions to the inadmissibility 
 
 1.  Hearsay, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/hearsay (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2018). 
 2.  Laurence D. Borten, Hearsay and the Rights of the Accused: A Comparison of U.S. Law and 
Anticipated Practices of the International Criminal Court 2 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://docplayer.net/15142605-Hearsay-and-the-rights-of-the-accused-a-comparison-of-u-s-law-and-
anticipated-practices-of-the-international-criminal-court.html. 
 3.  Id. at 6; Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motions 
to Admit Statements as Substantive Evidence (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2005). 
 4.  Borten, supra note 2, at 2 n.5. 
HALPERN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2018  1:30 PM 
106 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 29:103 
of hearsay found in these jurisdictions—present sense impression,5 excited 
utterances,6 death of the original witness, etc.7 —would apply in this context. 
While hearing the evidence from the original witness or seeing it on the 
original document is always better evidence than hearing or reading it second 
hand, in the context of war, hearsay may be the best, if not the only, evidence 
available. The unique circumstances of war require unique trial procedures. 
Documents, even if not intentionally destroyed, may easily disappear, go 
missing, be destroyed by bombs or buried beneath rubble. First-hand 
witnesses may be dead or missing. Meanwhile, time is of the essence, and 
occasionally these trials take place even while the hostilities are ongoing. 
The typical procedures of criminal courts in domestic systems are not 
sufficient and often do not make sense in this unfamiliar context. As 
Brigadier General Taylor said in relation to one of the Nuremberg trials, 
there is a “necessity for liberal rules of evidence” because “lips of many 
potential witnesses were sealed by violence and many records have 
disappeared either by intention or by the fortunes of war.”8 In addition, given 
the international character of war crimes trials, it might be tempting but is 
impossible to accommodate all of the various domestic criminal law systems. 
At the same time, given the grave nature and global scale of the situation, 
these trials require a flexible and nuanced procedure. If not sui generis, the 
war crimes trial context is different enough that it should freely borrow from 
an array of rules and procedures to tailor an appropriate procedural model. 
Thus, just as perceptions of right and wrong change in light of war, the 
path to justice and fairness requires flexibility in the unstable context of a 
world just emerging from, or still in the midst of, upheaval. While the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence is generally considered to be unfair to the 
interests of the defendant in most common law jurisdictions, in the context 
of war crime trials, an approach of flexibility allows for the admission of 
hearsay evidence without impinging on the defendant’s fundamental right to 
fairness. The Nuremberg trials, as the first of these war-crime trials, paved 
the way in setting up these tribunals by showing that no one is above the law 
and distinguishing best evidence from best available evidence. The 
subsequent Tokyo Trials show the need for qualified adjudicators, the 
 
 5.  FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (defining a “present sense impression” as “[a] statement describing or 
explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”). 
 6.  FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (defining an “excited utterance” as “[a] statement relating to a startling 
event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”). 
 7.  FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. 
 8.  Richard May and Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 725, 732–33 (1999) [hereinafter Trends] (citing United States v. Carl Krauch et al., 15 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, at 898 (1946-1949)). 
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meaning of “relevance”, and the residual exception to hearsay evidence. 
Finally, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) focused on assessing reliability before determining admissibility 
through establishing a three-step approach of assessing relevance, probative 
value, and finally weighing any prejudicial effects. By investigating how the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal, and the ICTY have applied 
evidentiary standards, particularly the admissibility of hearsay, one sees that 
flexibility was paramount in these tribunals in order to successfully balance 
the interests of justice and fairness. So long as the concepts behind the 
admissibility of the evidence—“relevance,” “probative value,” “reliability,” 
and “credibility” —are applied in a uniform and coherent way, fairness can 
still be preserved. From these tribunals we learn that it is possible to allow 
typically inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, and still maintain 
fairness so long as the evidence is determined to be otherwise reliable and 
given the proper weight. 
II. NUREMBERG 
From the atrocities committed in World War II sprung the Nuremberg 
and the Tokyo trials. The “Nuremberg Trials” include the trial held in front 
of the International Military Tribunal as well as twelve trials of lower ranked 
Nazis9 under the auspices of Allied Control Council Law No. 1010 and 
governed by United States Zone Military Government Ordinance No. 711 as 
part of the U.S. occupation12 (“Ordinance No. 7 cases”).13 
President Truman appointed Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson as 
the chief prosecutor for the United States; Jackson was instrumental in the 
 
 9.  Including State Secretary of the Foreign Office, von Weizsaecker; cabinet ministers von 
Krosigk and Lammers; military leaders von Leeb, List, and von Kuechler; SS leaders Ohlendorf, Pohl 
and Hildebrandt; Flick; Josef Altstoetter; Alfried Krupp; and Gerhard Rose. 
 10.  Recognizing the following crimes: (a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; (c) crimes against 
humanity; and (d) membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the 
International Military Tribunal. Control Council Law No. 10, art. II, reprinted in TELFORD TAYLOR, 
FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 250–51 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1949). 
 11.  United States Zone Military Government, Ordinance No.7 (Oct. 18, 1946), reprinted in 1 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, at xxi (1946-1949). 
 12.  Even though these cases were conducted in the name of the United States and governed by US 
Military Ordinance, they were considered to be international trials. Benjamin Ferencz, Nurnberg Trial 
Procedure and the Rights of the Accused, 39 J.  CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 144, 144 (1948) (citing 
Judgment in U.S. v Alstotter, et al., transcript 10621). 
 13.  Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg War Crime Trials, 27 INT’L CONCILIATION 243, 256 (1949); 
STEVEN RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 6 (2009). 
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organization and set-up of the Nuremberg trials.14 From the perspective of 
the Soviet delegate, Major General Ion T. Nikitchenko, the trials were a 
waste of time as Nazi guilt had already been established, or rather, declared 
by Allied leaders at the Yalta conference, and thus the only thing left to 
decide was the “measure of guilt” and the appropriate punishment. However, 
Justice Jackson insisted that every defendant receive a fair and just trial with 
due process, based on the theory that, while the leader of a country could 
accuse, they could not convict.15 The insistence of Justice Jackson not only 
to try the defendants, but to try them fairly, stems from the U.S. criminal 
system in which a conviction is not valid without judicial finding.16 
Opponents of such a system advocated that since the Nazis never gave 
anyone a fair trial, they should not be entitled to one either;17 such was their 
retributory view of justice. However, Jackson’s influence was more 
profound and “for the first time in history, the rulers of a defeated nation 
would be given the benefit of the rule of law and due process.”18 
The Tribunal was composed of four active judges (and four alternates) 
representing the four allied powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the USSR.19 Given this international composition of the trial, a 
mixture of the common and civil law systems was required. The Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal,20 “The London Charter,” was the result 
of “blending and balancing . . . elements of the Continental European 
inquisitorial system and the Anglo-American adversarial system.”21 Jackson 
wanted the trial to be simple and efficient so that the procedure would not 
allow for obstructive and dilatory tactics that defendants tend to use in 
common law criminal trials.22 
The London Charter Articles 18-21 dealt with evidence.23 Article 18 
provided for the efficiency and avoidance of undue delay of the proceedings. 
An expeditious trial was possible because, without a jury, there was no need 
 
 14.  Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal 3 (Int’l Mil. Trib. 
in Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946). 
 15.  NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI WAR CRIME TRIALS 
CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 12 (2007) [hereinafter THE NUREMBERG LEGACY]. 
 16.  Id. at 12–13. 
 17.  See id. at 13. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 26–27. 
 20.  Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 
[hereinafter London Charter]. 
 21.  Evan J. Wallach, The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post World War II War Crimes 
Trial: Did They Provide An Outline For International Legal Procedure?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
851, 854 n.8 (1998-99). 
 22.  Id. at 856 n.22–23. 
 23.  London Charter, supra note 20, art. 18–21. 
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for the Tribunal to consider rules that were put in place to prevent jurors from 
hearing prejudicial evidence, e.g. hearsay evidence. Without the need to 
engage in special protections for a jury, an international criminal court can 
be less hindered by technical rules of evidence and may evaluate the 
evidence in the balancing process in accordance with the civil law principle 
of “free evaluation of evidence.”24 Article 20, for example, allows for the 
Tribunal to require information as to the nature of any evidence, and Article 
21 stipulates against the requirement for proof of common knowledge. The 
most important article for the purposes of this analysis is Article 19, which 
states: “The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It 
shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-
technical procedure and shall admit any evidence which it deems to be of 
probative value.”25 
Due to the nature of the particular conflict and the Nuremberg trial, 
documentary evidence was used more than eyewitness and oral testimony. 
In both the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials (discussed infra), the defendants 
were primarily commanders who did not carry out the crimes themselves but 
made the plans and transmitted orders. Therefore, the most “compelling 
witnesses against them were the documents they drafted, signed, initialed, or 
distributed.”26 Only ninety-four witnesses gave evidence at Nuremberg 
against nineteen defendants, but thousands of documents were admitted.27 
Similarly, the Tokyo trial admitted evidence from four hundred and nineteen 
witnesses but included close to five thousand documents.28 With such 
voluminous direct documentary evidence, the question of hearsay was not 
nearly as important as it might otherwise have been; the documents 
incriminating the accused were more compelling, and thus the hearsay 
evidence was not given as much weight. 
Despite the vast documentary evidence, hearsay did nevertheless play a 
role in the trial. It is often argued, in attempting to exclude hearsay evidence, 
that hearsay is not the “best” evidence. Common law jurisdictions have a 
“best evidence” rule which requires parties to produce the best evidence 
available.29 To avoid giving a common law jury prejudicial and unreliable 
 
 24.  RICHARD MAY AND MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 93 (2002); 
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 75 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda Jan. 27, 2000). 
 25.  London Charter, supra note 20, art. 19. 
 26.  TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG 
WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 86 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1949). 
 27.  Trends, supra note 8, at 744. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  GÖRAN SLUITER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1072 
(2013) [hereinafter SLUITER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (suggesting JOHN HENRY 
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evidence, the law and fact-finding functions are separated between the judge 
and jury respectively.30 The jury, as fact finder, should receive only the best 
evidence in making its determination. However, in the context of war crimes 
trials, the idea that hearsay evidence is not the “best” evidence is not always 
true. In fact, the Nuremberg tribunal did appear to follow the best evidence 
rule in determining whether and when to admit hearsay. During the course 
of the Nuremberg trials, the court did deny the prosecution’s request to enter 
an affidavit into evidence because the witness was nearby and available, 
upholding the principle of best and direct evidence.31 That is, “best” evidence 
meant “best available” evidence. 
In balancing the admissibility decisions, it is clear that the judges 
believed in maintaining the rights of the accused. For example, in the 
Ordinance No. 7 case of IG Farben, affidavits were held to be inadmissible 
as a violation of the right of the defendant to interrogate the witness.32 
Nuremberg foreshadowed the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), 
established in 1998, an approach more akin to the civil law system. Article 
69(4) of the ICC Rome Statute33 allows the Chamber to rule on the relevance 
and admissibility of any evidence itself. However, the ICC emphasized that 
the accused has a right to confront his or her accuser,34 and thus the 
admissibility of hearsay must be dealt with cautiously. 
As discussed above, it is also argued that hearsay evidence is unreliable 
and can prejudice the court. While this may be a concern in domestic 
criminal cases that include a jury, if no jury is present, it is at least arguable 
that it is unnecessary to shield judges from potentially prejudicial evidence 
because they are not as susceptible to prejudice as a jury.35 Further, judges 
must give detailed reasoning for their decisions, including what evidence 
they considered and what weight they gave it, creating a record that can be 
reviewed for fairness.36 On the other hand, jury deliberations are unrecorded, 
so their findings cannot be examined in this way. In short, with no 
impressionable and inexperienced jury, if the hearsay evidence is reliable, it 
 
WIGMORE & ARTHUR BEST, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE) (2005); 
PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE (Hodge M. Malek et al. eds., 2009); CAROLINE FENNELL, LAW OF EVIDENCE IN 
IRELAND (3d ed. 2009)). 
 30.  Id. at 1038. 
 31.  United States v. Carl Krauch, 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 753 (1946-49); TELFORD TAYLOR, 
THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 241 (1st ed. 1992). 
 32.  United States v. Carl Krauch, supra note 31, at 880–91. 
 33.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 34.  Id. at 93. 
 35.  See generally Benjamin B. Frenecz, Nurnberg Trial Procedure and The Rights Of The Accused, 
39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 144 (1948). 
 36.  Borten, supra note 2, at 2. 
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is not presumptively unfair to admit such evidence. Due to the absence of a 
jury in the Nuremberg Trials and the establishment of a reasoned record, 
there was no longer as strong a need to exclude hearsay evidence. The 
Nuremberg proceedings appeared to be focused more on the question of 
reliability of given evidence than upon its technical nature. Again, while 
clearly attempting to preserve fairness, procedural flexibility replaced rigid 
doctrine. 
III. TOKYO TRIALS – THE NUREMBERG ACROSS THE SEA 
In May 1946, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur brought Hideki Tojo, 
Prime Minister of Japan, along with twenty-six other defendants to trial in 
front of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, commonly 
known as the “Tokyo Trials.”37 The Tokyo Charter Article 13 mirrors the 
London Charter Article 19, stipulating that the Tribunal is not bound by 
technical rules of evidence and shall admit any evidence it deems probative 
in value. 38 
For the most part, the Tokyo trials mirrored the Nuremberg trials. In 
fact, some argue that “Tokyo simply ignored those criticisms [of the 
Nuremberg trials], made little attempt to profit by Nuremberg’s mistakes and 
merely followed suit.”39 However, there were a few differences worth 
mentioning. While the Nuremberg trial lasted a little over ten months, the 
Tokyo trial lasted about two and a half years.40  The Nuremberg tribunal 
consisted of eight judges (although only four had voting powers) while 
Tokyo had eleven judges each representing a nation that participated in the 
defeat of Imperial Japan (Australia, Canada, China, France, the United 
Kingdom, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the USSR, 
and the United States).41 One major difference between the two trials was 
that in Nuremberg, one of Justice Jackson’s praiseworthy principles was that 
no one was above the law no matter how high their status, so no principal 
offenders were exempt, whereas at Tokyo, Emperor Hirohito was not one of 
the men indicted despite direct implications. This Nuremberg principle, that 
no one is above the law, was an entirely new concept at the time and has 
 
 37.  THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 113. 
 38.  Charter of International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 13, Jan. 19, 1945, T.I.A.S. No. 
1589 [hereinafter Tokyo Charter]. 
 39.  THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 115. 
 40.   Id. at 114; Benjamin Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 203, 216 (1998). 
 41.  THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 113. 
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since brought other heads of state to the realization that they are not 
untouchable.42 
Similar to Nuremberg’s London Charter, the Tokyo Charter allowed the 
Tribunal not to be bound by technical rules of evidence and to admit any 
evidence it deemed of probative value. The intention again was to provide a 
fair trial and not simply to seek vengeance. The defendants were granted 
rights of due process such as the right to counsel, the right to examine 
witnesses, the right to apply for production of all prosecution documents and 
most importantly, the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.43 
Nevertheless, with flexibility of procedure comes the ability to abuse 
such procedure. Thus, it has been argued that the Tokyo trials were “poorly 
conducted and badly organized.”44The President of the Tokyo Tribunal, 
William Webb of Australia, noted inconsistency in rulings, particularly in 
favor of the prosecution, as the determination of the probative value of 
specific evidence would vary depending on the disposition of the court any 
given day.45 Ultimately, eight out of the eleven justices supported the final 
judgment and three dissented. The strongest dissent came from Justice Pal 
of India, who felt that the rules of evidence were biased in favor of the 
prosecution. Justice Pal disapproved of the practice of admitting hearsay 
“because the possible infirmities with respect to the observation, memory, 
narration and veracity of him who utters the offered words remain 
untested.”46 While this is generally a valid reason for the exclusion of hearsay 
evidence in domestic courts, in an international war crime tribunal, such 
reasoning is outweighed by unique concerns that favor admissibility. 
In the domestic systems that typically prohibit the use of hearsay, the 
inability of the witness to be present is one of the exceptions to the rule.47 
Thus while domestic common law systems which exclude hearsay evidence 
have similar situations in which witnesses are traumatized or afraid to testify, 
post-war tribunals are different. First, the tribunals are not prosecuting one 
person for committing one, or a few, crimes; these are crimes against 
 
 42.  Although in reality this does not occur as often as it perhaps should. 
 43.  Tokyo Charter, supra note 38, art. 9; THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 153; Trends, 
supra note 8, at 753; United States v. Flick, 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1188 (1946-1949). 
 44.  THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 119 (citing ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER 
NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS 225 (1st ed. 1987)). 
 45.  THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 449 (Antonio Cassese ed., 
2009) (citing THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 
(I.M.T.F.E.) 29 APRIL 1946 - 12 NOVEMBER 1948, 551, 654–55 (B.V.A. Röling & C.F. Rüter eds., 1977) 
[hereinafter JUDGE PAL]). 
 46.  Id. at 630. 
 47.  See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804; Crim. P. (Scot.) §259 (1995). 
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humanity and genocide. Second, the international scope with witnesses all 
over the world adds another level of difficulty in interrogating or even 
finding primary witnesses with the difficulty of travel and communication. 
Third, as noted previously, the person who uttered the words being offered 
may no longer be alive, may be too frightened to testify, and may be 
traumatized from the war, thus rendering his or her testimony unreliable. 
Finally, procedural efficiency is key in a post-war setting where the ultimate 
goal is reconciliation. 
Thus, the specific circumstances entailed by the war crime context 
require a flexible approach. This need for flexibility in hearsay rules is even 
already recognized at a domestic level. Both common and civil law systems 
have the basic principle that “all relevant evidence that has probative value 
is admissible unless affected by an exclusionary rule.”48 Even the U.S. 
system, which prohibits hearsay subject to limited exceptions,49 includes a 
“Residual Exception” that hearsay may be admitted if “the statement is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which 
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.”50 Thus, the admission 
of hearsay evidence rests on reliability and relevance. Even prior to both 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, in 1942, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
ordered the establishment of a Military Commission to try eight captured 
German Saboteurs; the Commission’s jurisdiction was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin.51 President Roosevelt, contemplating the 
war crimes trials before his death while the war was still ongoing, stated that 
the commission should admit evidence “as would, in the opinion of the 
President of the Commission, have probative value to a reasonable man.”52 
There is a relationship between probative value and relevance. Both look to 
a link between the evidence and proof of the fact in dispute.53  McCormick 
on Evidence divides “relevance” into two components: (1) materiality and 
(2) probative value. “Materiality concerns the fit between the evidence and 
the case. It looks to the relation between the propositions for which the 
evidence is offered and the issues in the case. . .the second aspect of 
relevance is probative value, the tendency of evidence to establish the 
 
 48.  SLUITER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 29, at 1039. 
 49.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d), 803, 804. 
 50.  Id. 807. 
 51.  317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 52.  PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE 
EAST, 1945-1951, at 12–13 (1979). 
 53.  Frank Terrier, The Procedure Before The Trial Chamber, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1277, 1279 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John 
R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002). 
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proposition that it is offered to prove.”54 Therefore, in deciding the 
“probative” value of evidence, the judges on these war crimes tribunals 
cannot judge the evidence simply based on the distance to the original person 
or document but must consider all aspects of materiality and relevance. 
While cross-examination and means of testing credibility are 
imperative in courts in which juries serve as the vulnerable fact-finders, it is 
arguable that the judges on these tribunals were capable of making such a 
determination for themselves. However, the Commission set-up for 
Yamashita,55 which the Supreme Court reviewed, was composed of military 
commanders, none of whom were lawyers or had legal experience.56 There 
is a serious question as to whether such constituted tribunals are any more 
qualified than juries to make determinations of weight and admissibility 
without binding rules. The Yamashita decision is extremely controversial in 
the international community,57while the Tokyo Tribunal, composed of 
legally experienced adjudicators, faced less controversy. In short, it seems 
clear that future war crime trials, in which judges are given wide latitude as 
to the admissibility of evidence, should have safeguards to ensure that the 
judges themselves are qualified for such a task. 
It is certainly true that in the Yamashita decision, Justices Wiley 
Rutledge and Frank Murphy “were taking standards of criminal procedure 
prevalent in a stable society and applying them to judgment of behavior in a 
chaotic, war-torn environment.”58 The context in which this commission and 
the previous Tokyo trials were set-up was one that was so vastly different 
from that of normal criminal courts that to simply transfer the procedures 
and standards from one to the other would be severely impracticable. While 
the war-torn context does not justify serious deprivation of rights and unfair 
trials, the concepts of “fair” and “just” are not concrete or context-free but 
rather require flexibility.  Therefore, the process of justice—exemplified by 
differences in balancing analyses—may look different from the national 
context, yet without sacrificing the underlying values. 
 
 54.  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 729 (Kenneth Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006). 
 55.  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Though by U.S. Military Commission, like the Ordinance 
No 7 trials, Yamashita is sufficiently connected to the Tokyo trials to merit analysis here. 
 56.  GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 
785 (2016); John M. Ferren, General Yamashita and Justice Rutledge, 28 J. SUPR. CT. HISTORY 54, 57 
(2003) [hereinafter General Yamashita]. 
 57.  William Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MILITARY L. REV. 1, 22 (1973). 
 58.  Ferren, supra note 56, at 72. 
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IV. ICTY – THE NUREMBERG AND TOKYO LESSONS APPLIED 
DECADES LATER 
Nearly fifty years after the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, the ICTY 
appeared to have learned the lessons from Nuremberg but, too, saw justice 
as achieved by flexibility. Slobodan Milosevic was the president of Serbia in 
1989 and Yugoslavia in 2000. In 1998, Milosevic began an ethnic cleansing 
program.59 On May 25th, 1993, the United Nations established the ICTY 
through Resolution 827 to try the perpetrators of these war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide with a tribunal that differed from 
Nuremberg.60 The Nuremberg tribunal was run by the four major powers 
occupying Germany at the time, and “the tribunals tried only the 
vanquished.”61 By contrast, the ICTY consisted of eleven judges, none of 
whom were from Yugoslavia, in an effort to avoid any potential “victors’ 
justice” criticism and tried subjects from all conflict parties.62 Geoffrey 
Robertson, a noted human rights lawyer appointed as a distinguished jurist 
of the United Nations Internal Justice Council, notes that the ICTY was the 
first truly international criminal court.63 The ICTY made a conscious effort 
to avoid the criticisms of Nuremberg and thus made four major changes to 
the procedure: (1) no death penalty, (2) no trials in absentia, (3) better 
treatment of defense counsel in regard to evidence discovery, and (4) the 
right of appeal.64 
As with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the evidentiary procedures for 
this tribunal to prosecute international war crimes required flexibility. The 
Tribunal was intended to be able to “mold its Rules and procedures to fit the 
task at hand” in order “to do justice. . .”65 The ICTY Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure (ICTY Rules), in Rule 42, lays down rights of the suspect. This 
Rule has been criticized as only applying to the Prosecutor, but Rule 37(B) 
extends the Prosecutor’s duties to staff and other persons under the direction 
of the Prosecutor. Rules 89-98 then govern the law of evidence.66 Rule 89(C) 
 
 59.  THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 154. 
 60.  S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 61.  STEVEN RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 212 (2009). 
 62.  THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 155. 
 63.  GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 
35 (2007). 
 64.  THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 156. 
 65.  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ¶ 18, 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Aug 10, 1995). 
 66.  Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/32 
(Mar. 14, 1994). 
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says that “any relevant evidence” can be used to prove the guilt or innocence 
of the accused.67 However, Rule 89(D) provides a way to balance this 
openness with the need to uphold fairness and justice by stating that evidence 
may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
need to ensure a fair trial.”68 In relation to hearsay evidence, the Chamber 
must be satisfied that the witness and the context were reliable.69 
Rule 89(A) of the ICTY Rules, meanwhile, explicitly states that the 
Chambers will not be bound by national rules of evidence.70 The Chamber 
in Prosecutor v. Blaskic explicitly interpreted this Rule to include the 
admissibility of hearsay on the basis that it is for the judge to decide on the 
final weight attributed to the hearsay evidence. “[T]he admissibility of 
hearsay evidence may not be subject to any prohibition in principle since the 
proceedings are conducted before professional Judges who possess the 
necessary ability to begin by hearing hearsay evidence and then to evaluate 
it, so that they make a ruling as to its relevance and probative value.”71 As 
with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the absence of a jury allowed great 
flexibility in the admission of evidence without prejudicing the accused; it 
was assumed that judges are capable of sifting through the evidence for the 
relevant and probative facts. The Chamber further held that admitting 
hearsay evidence before determining its reliability does not infringe on the 
accused’s rights nor on the ability to conduct a fair trial.72 
As opposed to the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials, where the 
defendants were mostly high-ranking officials making the orders and not 
carrying them out, the defendants in the ICTY cases were mostly those who 
physically carried out the brutal attacks.  Due to this key difference, more 
eyewitness testimony evidence was available. The subject of the first trial in 
front of the ICTY, and the first person to be tried for crimes against humanity 
 
 67.  Id. at r. 89(C). 
 68.  Id. at r. 89(D). 
 69.  Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on 
Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 16, 1999) (“It is well 
settled in the practice of the Tribunal that hearsay evidence is admissible. . . . Since such evidence is 
admitted to prove the truth of its contents, a Trial Chamber must be satisfied that it is reliable for that 
purpose, in the sense of being voluntary, truthful, and trustworthy, as appropriate; and for this purpose 
may consider both the content of the hearsay statement and the circumstances under which the evidence 
arose; or, as Judge Stephen described it, the probative value of a hearsay statement will depend upon the 
context and character of the evidence in question” (emphasis added)); see also CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 495 (2012). 
 70.  Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 66, 
at r. 89(A). 
 71.  Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 21, 
1998). 
 72.  Id. 
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since Nuremberg, was Duško Tadić in 1996.73 Tadić allowed hearsay if it 
was probative. In determining the probative value of evidence; the court was 
guided but not bound by traditional common law hearsay exceptions.74 
Subsequently, Prosecutor v. Delalic75 suggested that in allowing hearsay 
evidence, the Tribunal must first assess the reliability of the evidence and 
then rule on admissibility.76 Especially in relation to documentary evidence 
in the midst of an ongoing conflict, the Chamber advised that the threshold 
for admission should not be too strict.77 Even though there is no explicit 
mention in the Rules of reliability, the Chamber has claimed that “it is an 
implicit requirement. . . that the Trial Chamber give due consideration to 
indicia of reliability when assessing the relevance and probative value of 
evidence at the stage of admissibility.”78 To determine reliability, the court 
was to look to the truthfulness, voluntariness, and trustworthiness of the 
evidence.79 That is, just as in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence hinged on the concept of reliability. 
This concept of reliability for the purposes of the ICTY proceedings 
was defined in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al by comparing it to credibility: 
“Reliability assumes that the witness is speaking the truth, but depends upon 
whether the evidence, if accepted, proves the fact to which it is directed.”80 
Reliability can thus be seen as encompassing credibility as well as other 
factors such as accuracy and authenticity.81  Accuracy is as fluid a concept 
as it is subjective; it depends on the witness’s senses. Authenticity, on the 
other hand, relates to the objective concepts of authorship and source.82 It is 
assumed that these concepts, taken together, give the judge the proper tools 
to determine whether such evidence is probative. If the evidence is reliable, 
in that it is given with accuracy and authenticity by a credible witness with a 
credible original source, it should not matter that the original source is not 
 
 73.  THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, supra note 15, at 155. 
 74.  Borten, supra note 2, at 8 (citing Tadić, Decision on the Defense Motion on Hearsay (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 5, 1996)). 
 75.  Case No. IT-96-21-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia) [hereinafter Delalic]. 
 76.  Trends, supra note 8, at 747 (citing Delalic, Decision on Prosecution’s Oral Requests for the 
Admission of Exhibit 155 into Evidence and for an Order to Compel the Accused, Zdravko Mucic, to 
Provide a Handwriting Sample (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 19, 1998)). 
 77.  Delalic, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for the Redaction of the Public Record, ¶ 41 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 5, 1997); MAY & WIERDA, supra note 24, at 93–95. 
 78.  Trends, supra note 8, at 747 (citing Delalic, Decision on Motion of Prosecution for 
Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 20 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 19, 1998)). 
 79.  Id. at 747. This is also emphasized in Aleksovski, supra note 69, at ¶ 15. 
 80.  Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, ¶ 7 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2000). 
 81.  SLUITER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 29, at 1025. 
 82.  Id. 
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available. Given the context of these war crimes trials, the chance for the 
original source to be readily available is very slim and excluding such 
evidence could actually be more detrimental to justice. 
A typical argument against the inclusion of hearsay evidence is that it 
deprives the defendant of the basic right to confront his or her accuser.83  
Even the ICC, which attempts to strike a balance between the common and 
civil law systems, includes the right of the accused to examine witnesses 
against him or her as one of the “minimum guarantees” in Article 67 of the 
ICC Rome Statute.84 However, it should be noted that this safeguard against 
hearsay is only in relation to testimonial evidence. Under appropriate 
circumstances, even documentary hearsay may be excluded. Thus, in 
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez85 the Chamber excluded documents known 
as the “Zagreb Material” because it consisted of “hearsay statements that are 
incapable of now being tested by cross-examination.”86 Thus the Chamber 
combats this criticism in an indirect way. Here the Chamber specified the 
criteria to be taken into account when analyzing hearsay evidence: (a) if the 
statement was given under oath, (b) if it was subject to cross-examination, 
(c) if it was corroborated by other evidence, (d) if it was “firsthand” or more 
removed, and (e) if the statement originated at the time of the events or years 
later.87 
The Chamber in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski further added that while 
hearsay is admissible, its value will be lower than that of oral testimony in 
court.88 The Chamber emphasized that the purpose of the procedural rules of 
the ICTY was to promote “a fair and expeditious trial” and therefore there 
must be great flexibility.89 In fact, the particular excluded evidence in Kordic 
was a very rare case; it was much more frequent for hearsay to be admitted 
and then subsequently weighed in relative value. In other words, while the 
Chamber would admit hearsay evidence (if deemed probative), the hearsay 
 
 83.  Codified in the U.S. CONST. amend. VI and expanded upon in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980) & Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). For further discussion, see generally John 
Douglass, Admissibility as Cause and Effect: Considering Affirmative Rights under the Constitution, 21 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1047 (2003); Michael Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and 
the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REV. 151 (1978); J Broocks Greer III, Hearsay, the Confrontation 
Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA.  L. REV. 651 (1970). 
 84.  Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 67. 
 85.  Case No. IT-95-14/2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia). 
 86.  Kordic, Decision on Prosecutor’s Submissions Concerning “Zagreb Exhibits” and Presidential 
Transcripts, ¶ 39 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 1, 2000). 
 87.  Kordic, Decision on Appeal Regarding Statement of Deceased Witness, ¶ 27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000). 
 88.  Aleksovski, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 15 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 16, 1999). 
 89.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
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evidence would not weigh heavily compared to more direct or reliable 
evidence. Again, it is assumed that while the process of sifting through and 
deciphering the reliability of evidence is one that would be dangerous in the 
hands of a jury, a panel of judges in a Tribunal is capable of such a task 
without presumptively prejudicing the accused. 
These cases seem to have provided a three step approach: (1) the 
Chamber ensured the evidence was prima facie relevant; (2) the Chamber 
assessed the probative value of the evidence; and (3) the Chamber weighed 
this probative value against any prejudicial effects.90 Even though the 
nuances of war crime trial circumstances require flexibility in the admission 
of evidence, avoidance of unfairness and injustice is always an important 
consideration in international criminal trials. For example, while there is no 
requirement for the Chambers to use a best evidence rule, Prosecutor v. 
Martic demonstrates that the Chambers relied on the best evidence available 
given the circumstances.91 Any failure to produce the best evidence only 
played a part in assessing the weight to be attributed to such evidence. The 
evidence can be admitted and then subsequently deemed probative – or not 
– based on its relevance as determined by the judges sitting in the trial. 
The ICTY proceedings are indeed riddled with examples of hearsay 
evidence that was admitted but then subsequently deemed unreliable and 
thus of little weight. In Kordic, testimony about a television broadcast was 
admitted; however, the Chamber deemed it unreliable and accorded it zero 
weight because the tape itself was not provided to the Chamber.92 In relation 
to another piece of hearsay evidence, the Trial Chamber declared that it “is 
under a duty to try and ascertain the truth and to deprive itself of this 
document would put that duty at risk.”93 Thus the Tribunal is emphasizing 
its duty as an adjudicator. Part of the critique of In re Yamashita as discussed 
above was the fact that the adjudicators were military generals, not 
experienced legal minds. The role of the judges as fact-finders in these 
scenarios is to gather all the information they can and sift through such 
information, weighing each piece of evidence against one another on the 
basis of its reliability to come to an intelligent conclusion. Excluding hearsay 
evidence provides no material benefit in these circumstances. Allowing 
hearsay evidence into the trial merely sheds light on the facts and 
circumstances and thus should be part of the weighing process. Unless the 
hearsay evidence in question provides the ultimate proof of guilt, there is no 
 
 90.  SLUITER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 29, at 1023. 
 91.  Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11, Decision Adopting Guidelines on the Standards 
Governing the Admission of Evidence, ¶ 7 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 19, 2006). 
 92.  Kordic, Judgment, ¶ 534 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001). 
 93.  Kordic, supra note 86, at ¶ 44. 
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great harm to the rights of the accused so long as the professed standards of 
reliability are followed and so long as the judges are indeed capable of 
performing the judicial, inquisitorial, and fact-finding functions. 
V. A NOTE ON GUANTANAMO – A SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE 
The context of the Guantanamo trials is very different from the 
previously discussed war crime trials; thus, it is generally outside the scope 
of this paper and therefore will not be analyzed in depth here.94 However, 
some arguments used in these proceedings in relation to the admission of 
hearsay evidence shed light on the current discussion and demonstrate 
certain modern-day views towards such evidence. Specifically, there have 
been many contentions against the use of hearsay evidence in the context of 
US military commission proceedings against Guantanamo detainees. 
The preliminary draft of the Enemy Combatant Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 allowed for hearsay evidence unless it was unreliable or not 
probative.95 This was criticized by some who argued that defendants would 
not be able to receive a fair trial unless they were “given the protections of 
an ordinary court-martial – including the right to exclude hearsay.”96 Yet the 
circumstances surrounding these trials of suspected terrorists, while different 
from the war crimes trials of Nuremberg, Tokyo, and the ICTY, are still so 
vastly different from the circumstances surrounding normal court 
proceedings that what constitutes fairness in one circumstance cannot 
necessarily be fair in the other. The Nuremberg, Tokyo, and ICTY 
defendants were charged with grave and serious crimes against humanity, in 
war-connected trials in which time was often of the essence, and these trials 
often had significant political implications. The Guantanamo military 
commission trials do not quite fit into this model, yet the terrorist-state 
context makes them less like the normal criminal trial context and more like 
the contexts in Nuremberg, Tokyo, and the ICTY, which occurred in the 
contexts of hostility, significant political implications, and under the 
pressures of time sensitivity. 
In the Nuremberg, Tokyo, and ICTY trials, any evidence, including 
hearsay, would be deemed admissible if it was probative. As the above 
 
 94.  One major difference is that the detainees were tried in US federal courts, some by juries, while 
others involved military tribunals. 
 95.  Martin A. Hewett, Hearsay at Guantanamo: A “Fundamental Value Determination”, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1375, n.117 (2008) (citing a preliminary draft of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, § 213(b)). 
 96.  Jeffrey Rosen, A Terror Trial, With or Without Due Process, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/weekinreview/10rosen.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [hereinafter A 
Terror Trial]. 
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analysis demonstrates, the determination of probative value rests on 
reliability. Thus in connection to the Guantanamo detainee trials, many of 
these courts have justified admitting such hearsay if it is reliable.97 One case 
even goes so far as to say that “the question a habeas court must ask when 
presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible – it is always 
admissible – but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of 
reliability it exhibits” (emphasis added).98 Clearly, reliability is the key to the 
admissibility of hearsay and is particularly important in the weighing 
process. And as discussed above, hearsay should be admissible in trials 
without juries because the judges are presumably capable of deciphering the 
reliability and weight to attribute to each piece of evidence. However, to say 
that hearsay is always admissible opens the floodgates and seriously dilutes 
the concept of reliability. The previous war crime tribunals set a very low 
bar for the admissibility of hearsay but still required such evidence to pass 
some thresholds (i.e. relevance) before it could be considered admissible. 
These conflict-fueled contexts and circumstances historically have been 
repeating themselves and, unfortunately, will probably continue to do so. 
Professor Richard Goldstone, the South African chief prosecutor for the 
ICTY, said in relation to the Saddam Hussein trial before the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal that “[t]he more procedural rights you give the defendant, the more 
you allow him to continue the war by other means.”99 This is an extreme 
position and inconsistent with the fundamental principle that defendants 
should have the same basic and fundamental procedural rights and due 
process allotted to everyone else. One of the legacies of Nuremberg was the 
acknowledgement that even the most heinous people deserve a fair trial. A 
more complete way of looking at it may be not about reducing the rights of 
the defendant but perceiving these rights and the concept of justice at trial in 
the light of the surrounding circumstances. 
VI. SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE FAIRNESS 
Admitting hearsay evidence (and subsequently weighing it) was a 
necessity in the circumstances in which these war crimes trials were 
conducted. However, preserving fairness and justice remained a primary 
concern throughout. Thus, the accused’s counsel has always had the 
opportunity to object to the use of the hearsay evidence in the specific 
circumstance and the tribunals set up safeguards via burden and standard of 
 
 97.  Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); MIL. COMM. R. EVID. 803. 
 98.  Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (While the detainee trials are not habeas courts, this statement shows 
the trend of courts towards admitting hearsay evidence). 
 99.  A Terror Trial, supra note 96. 
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proof, how the evidence was to be weighed, the rules on disclosure, and 
ultimately, the use of modern day international human rights laws to fill any 
gaps. 
First, in considering burden of proof, the Nuremberg Tribunal, Tokyo 
Tribunal, and ICTY all seemed to accept the basic standards of the 
presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. “Any 
impartial study of the Nuremberg trials would, in the light of each record, 
impress the reviewer with the judicial fairness with which the evidence was 
treated [and] the rigid adherence to the requirement of ‘proof beyond 
reasonable doubt.’”100 In one of the Nuremberg Ordinance No. 7 cases, the 
Tribunal held “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” to entail moral certainty.101 
In another Ordinance No. 7 case, United States v. Flick,102 the judgment 
identified five principles in relation to these standards and burden of proof: 
(1) no conviction without proof of guilt; (2) proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt; (3) such presumption of innocence is allotted to each defendant; (4) 
the burden is on the Prosecution at all times; and (5) if credible evidence can 
lead both to a reasonable inference of guilt and of innocence, the court must 
infer innocence.103 These principles were demonstrated, for example, in the 
ICTY Delalic judgment.104 
At times, hearsay evidence has been allowed based on corroborating 
evidence in common law systems.105  This is an interesting development 
because there is no such exception in common-law countries.106 Yet how 
could one argue that a piece of evidence is not reliable if there is sufficient 
corroboration of it? A further protection afforded to the accused is that even 
if a piece of evidence is admitted, that does not necessarily mean it will be 
given great weight. However, all the evidence is needed in order to determine 
if there is sufficient corroborating evidence. That is, corroboration does not 
exist in a vacuum but only in the context of all the evidence. This is why, in 
war crime trials, hearsay should be admitted and its weight and value 
determined later. 
If the hearsay evidence is unfair or unreliable, the accused will still be 
protected; even if the tribunal admits such evidence, it will not afford it great 
weight: “There is a distinction. . . between a decision to admit evidence and 
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a decision as to how much weight to give the evidence once it has been 
admitted.”107 Thus in the Ordinance No. 7 Hostage Case, the Tribunal 
expressed the opinion that while it may admit hearsay evidence even without 
proof of authenticity, it cannot ignore authenticity and the usual rules of 
evaluating evidence in the weighing process.108 “Any other interpretation 
would seriously affect the right of the defendants to a fair and impartial 
trial.”109 As far as the ICTY tribunal was concerned, any evidence that had 
probative value was admissible unless the unfairness that would result 
outweighed the probative value substantially.110 
Additionally, as an attempt to ensure due process in typical domestic 
criminal cases, disclosure of the prosecution’s evidence is usually open to all 
counsel. But at the Nuremberg Trials, “conditions were decidedly not 
normal”111 and this is one of the criticisms of the trials’ fairness112: some 
incriminating documents were not revealed from the outset and were 
sometimes used with dramatic effect in cross-examination.113 This was one 
of the differences within ICTY proceedings: the principle of “equality of 
arms” was used to provide a safeguard for the accused.114 Under this 
principle, the prosecutor must disclose materials within thirty days of its 
initial appearance, allow the defense to inspect any materials if it so requests 
(although this opens the defense to reciprocal disclosure obligations), 
disclose the identity of any witnesses in sufficient time, and disclose any 
evidence suggesting innocence or implicating the credibility of evidence 
against the accused.115 Further, in line with the adversarial common law 
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model and as decided in Tadić116, the ICTY did not burden the defense with 
as many disclosure obligations as the prosecution.117 
Another safeguard the accused has is the exclusion of evidence obtained 
by illegitimate means. In the Nuremberg trials, evidence of pretrial 
interrogations was admitted and in the Ordinance No. 7 cases, the Tribunal 
even rejected an argument that such pre-trial interrogations violate the 
accused’s rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.118 
While this was potentially unfair to the defendant, the Tribunal did regard 
duress as a disqualifying factor in admitting such affidavits.119 As with the 
other potential sources of unfairness criticized in the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials, the ICTY attempted to provide more rules in its procedures that 
addressed these concerns. ICTY Rule 95, for example, calls for the exclusion 
of any evidence “obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its 
reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, 
the integrity of the proceedings.”120 Again, the concept of reliability 
permeates the evidentiary analysis, thus demonstrating the commitment to 
fairness. Thus even though these tribunals admitted hearsay evidence, they 
used procedural safeguards of reliability to protect the defendants from 
unfairness. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
War is not a normal circumstance and war crimes are not normal crimes 
as contemplated by domestic criminal laws. Consequently, war crimes trials 
cannot be considered under the same procedures as everyday domestic 
criminal trials. The defendants in these trials are accused of genocide, 
violations of the laws of war, and grave crimes against humanity. That said, 
in the end, all human beings should be entitled to a fair system of justice. 
Fairness and justice are and should be universal constants; however, the 
paths to fairness and justice must be malleable and adapt to different 
circumstances. In the context of war crimes trials, the crimes involved are of 
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such a grave and serious nature that the desire to deter the perpetrator and 
the general public from further crimes while searching for closure for the 
past and moving toward reconciliation, supports the argument in favor of a 
very liberal approach to evidence. It is a very difficult balancing process but 
one that can be achieved within the overall standard of fairness and justice 
implemented by these tribunals. 
A point of controversy in relation to the fairness of the Nuremberg, 
Tokyo, and ICTY trials was that hearsay was deemed admissible. The 
presence of an impressionable and inexperienced jury – which leaves no 
record of its reasoning – caused common law systems to formulate a 
presumption against the admissibility of hearsay evidence subject to a few 
sharply delimited exceptions. Of course, if these trials followed the common 
law approach of excluding hearsay evidence, the exceptions seen in most 
domestic systems would have been applicable to many of the hearsay 
situations. However, these war crime trials more closely followed the 
civilian law tradition, where hearsay is presumed admissible conditioned on 
probative value because of the absence of a jury. 
The general admission of hearsay evidence in these trials did not mean 
the evidence was admitted arbitrarily. It has been clear from the cases that 
the judges did seriously examine each piece of evidence, and looked at its 
reliability, relevance, and trustworthiness. The common key terms in these 
war crime trials on the admissibility of hearsay evidence are: “relevance,” 
“probative value,” “reliability,” and “credibility.” The real problem is that 
these terms do not appear to be used in a uniform and coherent way. While 
flexibility is generally a good thing, we still need clear standards. If these 
terms are given internationally accepted set standards or definitions, the 
proper usage of these thresholds would allow for hearsay evidence to be 
acceptably admissible in trials, even while upholding due process, fairness, 
and justice for the accused. 
Common law systems essentially have a categorical rule precluding the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence, coupled with closely defined exceptions. 
The civil law systems for the most part avoid a “rule” as such and rely on the 
judge to determine the weight to be given to any evidence, rather than its 
admissibility. The Nuremberg procedure adopted a flexible approach to the 
common law rule in that it did determine admissibility, but not on the basis 
of categorical rules and exceptions. Rather, it did so as to the reliability of 
the hearsay when it was the best evidence available. This approach is 
especially appropriate in the context of war crimes trials. Combining a 
general preference against hearsay with general admissibility centered 
around a case-by-case judicial determination of reliability seems to be a good 
way to produce a fair and just result. 
HALPERN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2018  1:30 PM 
126 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 29:103 
The circumstances in which these trials take place require nuanced and 
flexible rules regarding evidence. The context of war crimes is that people 
can be killed, whole cities can be burned, documents can disappear in the 
chaos, and oftentimes, hearsay evidence is thus the best evidence available. 
The circumstances underlying preclusion of hearsay evidence as unfair to the 
defendant in some domestic systems simply is not present in the war crime 
context. As the war crimes trials have demonstrated in practice, if any 
evidence, hearsay or not, is not considered reliable and relevant, it will not 
be admissible anyway. So long as there are adequate safeguards found in 
procedures and  the tribunal is properly constituted with capable judges who 
are required to provide detailed reasoning with their judgments, then the 
general admissibility of hearsay evidence in war crimes trials does not 
provide a great threat to the rights of the accused and in fact provides for a 
fairer trial. 
War crime trials and especially the idea of treating defeated parties 
fairly are relatively new phenomena. For this reason, the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials helped pave the way for human rights law. In the end, 
“Nuremberg proved that a flawed trial is better than none. In following the 
positive elements of the Nuremberg precedent, the Tokyo trial was still 
worthwhile. Even if the process had many defects, it was better to hold the 
trial, make the record and make the attempt at justice.”121 
Despite the arguable flaws in the procedures, the success of Nuremberg 
can be seen from the fact that the word “Nuremberg” has acquired a meaning 
beyond geography or history but “grew to represent a commitment to 
justice.”122  It is certainly very easy and understandable for society to not 
want to treat fairly someone who has treated others so unfairly. However, 
one of the legacies of Nuremberg is that allegiance to the concepts of fairness 
and justice requires that every person, regardless of their alleged crime, 
deserves a trial bound by the standards of fairness and justice. This goal was 
at least arguably accomplished, even with the admission of hearsay evidence 
as representative of procedural methods adapted to the unique 
circumstances.  Indeed, some say that “Nuremberg remains legalism’s 
greatest moment of glory.”123 The admissibility of hearsay evidence is part 
of a delicate balancing act that takes place as judges in war crimes tribunals 
seek to uphold and preserve justice amidst chaos and hostility. 
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